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Organisations have spent a decade instrumenting everything except the humans who decide their outcomes. That is starting to change. Most strategic failures are people failures. The data was available and the signals were public. What the organisation misjudged was a person: how a minister would react under pressure, how a regulator would read an ambiguous filing, how a counterparty would behave once the deal got hard, how a journalist would frame a difficult story. Look at wh

Clubs can now measure almost everything a player does. The rooms where a club's future is actually decided remain unmeasured. That gap is the widest inefficiency left in sport. More than two decades on from Moneyball, the on-field argument is over. Recruitment runs on models. Expected goals sits in the Saturday night graphics. Tracking data prices players, sets pressing schemes and gets set-piece coaches hired. A Premier League club can tell you a full-back's sprint volumes,

Political simulation was invented in a Santa Monica office in the 1950s. It worked. It could never scale. The economics have now changed. In the mid-1950s a group of RAND Corporation analysts began doing something that looked, from the outside, like an eccentric use of US Air Force money. They played games. Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier ran exercises in which teams of analysts took the roles of governments. One team played Washington, another played Moscow, and a control